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In some ways half of my published works have been about the Thirteenth Amendment.1
In those writings directly on the Thirteenth Amendment, I have examined the Thirteenth
Amendment from the framers’ perspective. 2 I’ve focused on framers and aspirations, a
relatively classic move in originalism.
The remarkable feature of the Originalism in the context of the Thirteenth Amendment
is that the framers were the Radical Republicans, a group comprised of two separate strains of
political thinkers who came together for a common end. The first group were the abolitionists,
identified by senators like Charles Sumner, and speakers and writers like Wendell Phillips and
Frederick Douglas. The second group were free labor adherents, including Senators Henry
Wilson, Lyman Trumbull, and others. If ever there was a period in American constitutional
history where the reformers were interested in protecting the least well off,3 specifically
persons other than themselves, the Reconstruction Congress was that time. Thus, the
originalism was liberal originalism.4
How does Originalism function in the Reconstruction era? While Originalism in the
context of the original, some say, flawed, Constitution depended not only on debates, and the
texts, but even on an expanded set of texts found in the exchange of letters called the
“Federalist papers,” there has not been a similarly well-developed set of supplemental texts to
demonstrate meaning from a framers’ intent approach. Some excellent new work is exploring
that as scholars like Rebecca Zietlow go through the papers of auteurs like James Ashley.5
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Developing this corpus of understanding will be extremely useful for further generations of
interpreters of the Reconstruction Amendments. Alexander Tsesis pulls in Charles Sumner and
Jacob Howard.6 The concerted activity of multiple senators working on a series of
constitutional reforms to reshape the nation as well as the constitution need not be
individuated, as Jack Balkin wisely points out in his work, The Reconstruction Power. 7 Balkin
comes closest to the mark of realizing that in moving from the Thirteenth Amendment to the
Fourteenth Amendment, some senators expressed the opinion, not of the Thirteenth’s deficits,
but that going further with the Fourteenth made the point even more clearly. The Fourteenth
and Fifteenth amendments had not been mapped out with the passage of the Thirteenth.
Overlapping powers, in Balkin’s analysis, in the sense of congressional powers, was not a flaw,
it was a feature.8 Overlapping intentions, similarly, is not Occam’s razor -- no more than
absolutely necessary as a limiting principle -- it was instead a series of thinkers building on each
others’ collective momentum for reform.
Who were the leaders in the Reconstruction Congress? Unlike the framers of the
original Constitution, the movers and shakers were not established eastern landowners. Many
of the “Framers” hailed from the west, hence, the Reconstruction amendments are more the
Constitution of the West. Lyman Trumbull,9 James Ashley,10 and Jacob Howard of Michigan,11
Thaddeus Stevens from western Pennsylvania. Still I continue to read Senator Henry Wilson of
Massachusetts with awe. If anyone had a plan, and demonstrated a method of getting there
by a series of well-placed political moves, it was Henry Wilson, the cobbler of congress.12 Little
by little, Henry Wilson expanded the likelihood and legitimacy of the ultimate abolition in the
Thirteenth amendment to the Constitution, by liberating the bound laborers of the District of
Columbia and bound slaves who joined Union forces, were married to Union soldiers, or fell
behind Union lines, etc. These well-chosen moves meant that actions that had the breadth of
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the Emancipation Proclamation, that he urged on President Lincoln, and the Thirteenth
Amendment to the Constitution came within reach.
In this paper, I would like to explore a more adventurous reading, not to supplant the
work and intentions of men like Henry Wilson, but to supplement it. The grievance-based
approach asks what was wrong with the original constitution that the Reconstruction
Amendments and particularly, the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to fix.13
The language of the Amendment borrowed from the language of the Northwest
Ordinance is definitive in its negation of slavery and any slave-like existence, but less expansive
in elaborating what slavery is. The Congress refused to quibble with wording in adopting the
Thirteenth Amendment. As Senator Trumbull who performed the role of floor manager in the
Senate on behalf of the Radical Republicans suggested that "if every member of the Senate is
to select the precise words in which a law shall be clothed, and will be satisfied with none
other, we shall have very little legislation."14 Haste was of importance in this post war setting.
The Radical Republicans pushed for more and faster-- rather than less-- legislation and
constitutional amendment.
Little attention has been focused on what I will call “grievance-based interpretation”
until very, very recently15, and then, ironically, by a political movement. The Tea Party
movement took its name from a grievance said to have been part of the trigger of the
American revolution and its Constitution: “No taxation without representation.” Several of the
Constitutions’ more specific provisions are said to stem from specific grievances that the
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Americans suffered at the expense of the British. The proscription against the quartering of
troops in time of peace is one example. 16 Others have suggested the right to bear arms was
included in the Constitution in response to grievances against the crown.17
The idea behind grievance-based interpretation is that law is enacted in response to a
grievance with the previous set of circumstances. In Scott Shapiro’s language, “[L]aws are
plans, or planlike norms.” Similarly, constitutional amendments are planlike norms, especially
when they proclaim an endstate, that something “shall not exist.”
As the focus on framers necessitates the question who should speak for them, so too
the grievance-based approach requires the question: Who should speak for the grievants?
Guyora Binder hints that the grievance was the slaves’ after all, the people who were “the least
well-off,” in Henry Wilson’s formulation. These individuals were unlikely to have been framers
in the hall of Congress as the Reconstruction amendments were debated. This grievance
based approach must necessarily introduce a supplementary group to the Framers, who were
in a position to enact the law, and certainly not the least well-off group. (At one point, I toyed
with the notion that those slaves who stood outside the chambers of congress, cheering and at
other times verbally reacting, like should be considered part of the dynamic by which the
Thirteenth Amendment was enacted.18 There is considerable historical support for the notion
that popular sentiment loudly expressed in public places was considered an acceptable form of
influence of legal matters, and the Congressional Globe records outbursts and attempts to
quiet the chamber.19) I subsequently have concluded that grievance-based interpretation is a
sounder method of supplementation.
In his probative essay, Guyora Binder asks the probing question, “Did the Slaves
Author the Thirteenth Amendment?”20 Professor Binder has no particular slave or set of
slaves in mind. The focus on grievance leaves us open to projecting a set of actual or fictional
slaves onto the language. Harriet Beecher Stowe’s sensational success with “Uncle Tom’s
Cabin” opens the door to a popular meaning as a constitutional method of interpreting the
Thirteenth Amendment from the perspective of the fictional characters, Uncle Tom, Eliza, and
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George Harris. After all, in terms of popular meaning, the lives of Uncle Tom, Eliza and
George, were more familiar to many northerners than the circumstances of real slaves.
I prefer to stick to what can be known about the experiences and circumstances of
millions of Americans before the act of emancipation and Constitutional amendment. After
all, what could be considered more clearly a grievance than enslavement! Several former
slaves are good informants on the issue of what the Thirteenth Amendment meant from a
grievance-based approach. One could turn to the writings of Frederick Douglas, William Wells
Brown,21 or any number of slave narratives written during the era.22 One could even turn to a
broader set of actors who took up arms against slavery like Nat Turner and even John Brown,
who collected support for his famous raids in Kansas in states like Massachusetts.
Ideally positioned to raise the perspective of enslavement as a grievance is another
couple whose legal actions demonstrated the flaws in the unamended Constitution: Dred Scott
and his wife, Harriet Robinson Scott. Before we approach the more challenging parts of this
analytic argument, let us dispense with the easy ones. There is no doubt that Dred Scott v.
Sanford is recognized as one of the legal impetuses for Constitutional revision.23 The litigation
is a grievance on at least two distinct levels: 1) the level of holdings in the Taney opinion, and 2)
the original grievance of enslavement experienced by the Scott family.
There is good, solid information that Reconstruction Congress considered the Dred
Scott case as one of the Constitutional results they sought to reverse. The Congressional
Globe carries repeated references deploring the result in the Dred Scott case, as the problem
that the unamended constitution brought about. Quite poignantly, just days after the
decision, Massachusetts senator Henry Wilson, who would become a major architect of the
Thirteenth Amendment, attempted to aid one of his free black friends, and Massachusetts
constituents in publicly applying for an American passport, to test the theory of whether free
Americans of African descent could receive a passport as an American citizen. The state
department refused to issue the passport since the free Black Boston resident was now
deemed not to have American citizenship.24 Clearly, the decision’s holding that Dred Scott
was not a citizen of a state entitled to invoke jurisdiction of the federal courts must be
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considered as one of the major grievances that the Amendment sought to redress. Section 2
of the Amendment also falls into place with a grievance-based analysis. The other two
holdings were that the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise were
unconstitutional as beyond congressional power. What better fix than to grant Congress
power in a way that Taney’s interpretation of the old Constitution had previously proscribed.
No Supreme Court decision could ever again hold that Congress did not hold the power over
this matter.
This level of analysis locates the grievance in the Taney opinion in Dred Scott v Sanford.
A more redemptive reading would shift analysis to the litigants’ grievance.
What was Dred Scott’s grievance? One loses the focus by reading the pleadings and by
the popular account in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s fiction. Generations of scholars of the Dred
Scott case have wondered what his grievance was since reporters interviewing him considered
that he was “practically free” even before the law suit.25 As the front man for the family’s law
suit, Dred appears to have engaged in some protective shucking when he found himself the
most famous Black in America. He was quoted, and re-quoted as declaring the lawsuit “a heap
of trouble” when it was over.26 Contrary to the necessary formalism of pleading the case, Dred
Scott had no actual claim that he had been chained, confined, or beaten as the image of
enslavement usually conjures up.
More illuminating is the fact that the lawsuit was not simply the suit of a lone man
seeking freedom, it was a family’s lawsuit.27 In only recently revealed evidence, letters of the
opposing counsel, Lyman Norris reveal that Norris offered to buy Dred “and his
family,”(emphasis added), if Dred would bargain with him, rather than pursue the suit.28 In
fact, as the family’s grievance, the circumstances of Mrs. Dred Scott, the co-litigant, seem
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more centrally representative. Harriet supported and kept the family together through the
eleven years of litigation, and under the principle of matrilinearity, the fates of three members
of the family of four depended upon her status. Their daughters would be deemed free and
could not be sold away from them, if the court determined that Harriet was a free woman.
Dred’s status was irrelevant to their daughters’ future lives as free persons.
Viewing the Thirteenth Amendment from Harriet Robinson Scott’s perspective of
grievance, Taney’s interpretation of the unamended Constitution thwarted her avenue of
redress, as did Missouri law, the institution of slavery and the racist interpretation presuming
enslavement for persons of color.29 Not only was she not a citizen of the state, nor a person
whose rights had to be respected by white persons, the laws and practices of enslavement
rendered her and her children slaves for life. As slaves for life she was prevented from saving
herself or her children from indignity and further involuntary servitude, her husband from
being stolen away, or realizing the fruits of her labor by being able to retain the wages that her
laboring under the court’s decree for several years had withheld from her. That was Harriet
Scott’s grievance. To right the wrong of the Dred Scott case, to determine that slavery shall
not exist, American families need to be allowed and enabled to determine their futures by
taking care of themselves. The modern-day Harriet Robinson Scott is a lower class mother
working one or two jobs in the service sector to provide for her family and seeing a future that
offers her children little better. From a grievance-based perspective, the Thirteenth
Amendment’s promise is that she is not pressed into poverty or the need to sacrifice her
children in order to make ends meet. The freedom that the Thirteenth Amendment should
assure is that hardworking adults can find decent work that supports them and their children.
A slave mother’s Thirteenth Amendment is that her children and her reproductive function are
not harnessed to another person’s volition and possible exploitation.
What does this interpretation yield us? “Slavery and Involuntary Servitude shall not exist”
guarantees a space of family privacy and integrity as a very basic and personal right. It links
that right as part and parcel of the opportunity to find decent work to support one’s family and
the next generation. This grievance-based interpretation suggests an understanding of
enslavement as far broader than the markers of brutal violence and physical force. There is no
evidence that Dred or Harriet Scott were subject to beatings or confinement. Enslavement can
exist by circumstances of coercion that prevent individuals and families from having some role
in choosing their own futures30 and remaining together in the common quest for survival.
Slaves had no realm of privacy, at the very least abolishing slavery, declaring that it
could not exist, returned to Harriet and her daughters the privacy that enslavement had denied
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them. Slaves had no right to marry and have the bond of marriage recognized by law. Slaves
had no right to freedom from interference by third parties.
One additional argument exists for utilizing a grievance-based interpretation of the
Thirteenth Amendment from the perspective of Harriet Robinson Scott. I invoke that
argument by responding to a criticism of the use of Harriet as the focal grievant. The criticism
could be made that the Thirteenth Amendment did not incorporate Harriet fully into the polity.
Even with the Fifteenth Amendment, Harriet did not have the right to vote. Enslaved African
American women were left out.
There are three responses to this argument. First, the Congressional globe debates
make frequent references to the manifest injustice of selling children away from their mothers,
or in the more dramatic language of the nineteenth century debates, ripping babies from their
mother’s breasts. This mother-child separation, involuntarily on the part of the mother, is one
of the evils that the Congressional speakers articulate.
Second, although African American women, like Harriet, did not get the right to vote
under the Fifteenth Amendment, their statuses were profoundly altered by the declaration
“slavery shall not exist.” In many ways, African American women were the least well-off, even
in comparison to their father’s, brothers, or sons. If the Thirteenth Amendment was directed
at improving the status of the least well-off, they are the appropriate grievants to consider.
Third, finally, and most importantly, a constitutional amendment like constitutional
formation alters the polity by creating a new social contract. This new social contract was
intended to improve the lot of the least well-off. That suggests that their perspectives should
be referenced in its interpretation. This speaks to taking the grievance-based interpretation
into account rather than the perspective of bestowing some limited, grudgingly bestowed
privilege upon the newly included group. From a legal process perspective, it requires
attention to the interests of the newly included group. Neither Harriet nor Dred sought the
right to vote in their litigation. Their needs were more basic, more fundamental, and more
material.
The Thirteenth Amendment was the first step of the Reconstruction impetus; it
exemplified a spirit of redressing the grievance of slavery; but it wasn’t the last.

